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ABSTRACT 
 
Sovereign bond contracts create unique legal problems for bondholders, issuers, 
and courts. Specifically, when a sovereign becomes insolvent, there is no international 
workout mechanism through which the sovereign’s debt can be efficiently restructured. 
Absent a mechanism similar to bankruptcy for sovereigns, some bondholders may 
attempt to resist restructuring in an effort to obtain a legal judgment for the full value of 
their initial investment. Until recently, the legal status and rights of these holdout 
creditors has been uncertain. However, a recent Second Circuit decision upheld creditors’ 
rights to hold out or resist a sovereign’s attempt to restructure its debt. Of course, this 
decision creates a host of other problems related to collective action and efficiency. 
International legal scholars remain uncertain whether such judgments are enforceable 
against a sovereign. The Supreme Court of the United States has accepted a petition for 
certiorari regarding enforceability issues and is considering a petition for the underlying 
question of holdout creditors’ rights. 
This paper highlights the complexities and complications that have brought 
sovereign debt to the forefront of international legal scholarship. Although scholars and 
politicians have proposed solutions to the sovereign debt dilemma, the paper argues that 
none of the proposed solutions provides an adequate remedy to the problem. Using an 
original economic model, the paper argues that an Argentinian default (repudiation) is the 
socially optimal response to the NML Capital decision and will lend the most stability to 
the sovereign debt market. However, as a repeat player in the international bond market, 
Argentina has an individual incentive to comply with the Second Circuit’s order and pay 
 iii 
the holdout creditors. Finally, the paper considers how the Supreme Court may provide a 
more realistic avenue to alter the adverse incentives that the Second Circuit’s decision 
created. 
 iv 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For centuries, the issue of securities has provided a mechanism for borrowers and 
debtors to obtain capital quickly for immediate use. This mechanism has proven equally 
beneficial for lenders and creditors, by affording them an opportunity to lend capital now 
for repayment at a premium (or with accrued interest) in the future. However, this system 
is not without risks. As long as debtors and creditors have existed, civil society has 
recognized that sometimes debtors fail to pay their debts1 and has created policies to 
govern the creditor-debtor relationship.2 Most importantly, institutions and mechanisms 
have evolved in order to protect creditors from borrowers who fail to pay their debts or 
default. Interest rates, the use of collateral, bankruptcy regimes, and even criminal 
proceedings have evolved in the interest of creditor protection to ensure that lenders are 
afforded safeguards ex ante and judicial recourse ex post. However, when the borrower is 
a sovereign state, courts and creditors alike face a host of obstacles that make traditional 
safeguards impracticable.  
Using the current conflict between NML Capital and the Republic of Argentina as 
a case study3, this paper will first analyze the specific problems that sovereign debt 
presents for both creditors and courts. Second, it will argue that given the current legal 
state of sovereign debt and the absence of an appropriate solution, a particular outcome to 
the NML Capital case is socially optimal. Part I will provide an overview of the facts of 
NML Capital v. Argentina. Part II will use the case’s particular facts and the arguments 
made by each party to illustrate the legal challenges and complexities of enforcing 
                                                
1 Psalm 37:21-22 “The wicked borrow and do not repay, but the righteous give generously.” 
2 Deuteronomy 15:1-2 instructed that outstanding debts should be expunged from the creditor’s books every 
seven years.  
3 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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sovereign debt agreements. After recognizing the obstacles that sovereign debt presents, 
Part III will provide a framework for analyzing external solutions and judicial outcomes. 
Part IV will explore various solutions to these obstacles that have been employed by 
international business transaction lawyers or proposed by supranational organizations. 
After concluding that none of the current proposals or remedies effectively mitigate the 
problems outlined in Part II, Part V will return to the conflict between NML Capital and 
Argentina. This section offers an economic model for analyzing the a lender’s decision to 
restructure or holdout. This model will help evaluate the externalities of the judicial 
decision, as well as the subsequent action by the parties involved. Particularly, this 
section will identify the socially optimal response to the Second Circuit decision, but it 
will also explain why Argentina’s individual incentives render the country unlikely to 
respond in the socially optimal way. Finally, Part VI will analyze the decisions before the 
United States Supreme Court and offer suggestions for how the nation’s highest court can 
correct the adverse incentives created by the Second Circuit’s decision. 
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PART I: A CASE STUDY: NML CAPITAL LTD. V. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA 
 
A. Background Facts  
 
In the 1990s, investors from the “developed world” began investing heavily in 
“emerging markets” like Argentina. Between 1992 and 1994, foreign direct investment 
into Argentina averaged $3.6 Billion US Dollars annually.4 At the time, Latin American 
and South America were widely thought to be the next big area for economic growth, so 
prospects for investors seemed promising.5 Looking to capitalize on widely available 
foreign and domestic investment, Argentina began issuing securities pursuant to a Fiscal 
Agency Agreement (“FAA”) in 1994.6 This bond issuance offered investors coupon rates 
ranging from 9.75% to 15.5%, with maturities ranging from April of 2005 to September 
2031.7 Notably, the FAA contained a “pari passu” clause, which stated that securities 
issued pursuant to that agreement should “at all times rank pari passu without any 
preference among themselves.”8 The clause further stated “the payment obligations of the 
Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other 
present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness…”9 This second 
portion is often referred to as the “Equal Treatment Provision” in the court opinions and 
briefs. The pari passu clause generally, and the Equal Treatment Provision specifically 
are important, as they contain critical, yet vague language whose intent and meaning 
became the focal point of the litigation between the parties. 
                                                
4 Robert Bouzas & Daniel Chudnovsky, Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development: The 
Recent Argentine Experience (May 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (On file with Universidad de San 
Andres), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_report_argentina.pdf. 
5 Patrick J. Regan, South of the Border: Investors Discover Latin America, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL, 
Vol. 48, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1992), at 9-12. 
6 NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012). 
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
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The boom of the early 1990s was quickly followed by a sharp decline for the 
Argentine economy.  Argentina entered a recession in 1998 and concerns about the 
country’s massive external debt soon followed.10 Political and economic turmoil came to 
a head in December of 2001 when unemployment reached nearly 20%, decimating 
Argentina’s tax revenues and sparking domestic outcry against Argentine government 
policies.11 It seemed almost certain that Argentina would default on the $132 Billion US 
dollars in foreign debt that it accumulated through the 1980s and 1990s, including the 
FAA bonds. Argentina implemented austerity measures that included severe cuts to 
government salaries and spending, reduction of government pensions, and even 
conversion of private pension funds to Argentine treasury bills in order to service 
Argentina’s massive foreign debt accumulation.12 The country also restricted withdrawal 
of bank deposits to counter the run on domestic banks. However, austerity measures 
failed to comply with requirements set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the bank discontinued its support system for the South American country.13 While the 
austerity measures were insufficient to gain the support of the international community, 
their severity triggered riots by Argentine nationals, resulting in 20 deaths and a series of 
crucial political resignations.14 
 Following the widespread rioting and the resignation of President Fernando de la 
Rua, Argentina’s Assembly nominated Adolfo Rodríguez Saa to serve as interim 
                                                
10 International Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002, Issues Paper/ Terms of 
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). July 2003.  
11 The Events that Triggered Argentina’s Crisis, BBC News (Dec. 21, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1721103.stm.  
12 Id. 
13 International Monetary Fund, supra note 10.  
14 BBC, supra note 11.  
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president.15 On the second day of his eight-day tenure in office, Saa went before the 
Argentine Assembly and declared a temporary moratorium on principal and interest 
payments on more than $80 billion of Argentina’s public external debt, including the 
FAA Bonds.16 Each year since 2001, Argentina renewed the moratorium and has refused 
to pay the external debt.17  
In 2005, Argentina began to restructure its outstanding debt by issuing an 
exchange offer to its creditors. This exchange offer created new, unsecured and 
unsubordinated debt for which holders of old FAA bonds could exchange their current 
securities at a rate of 25 to 29 cents on the dollar.18 By accepting the new bonds, the 
creditors agreed to forgo remedies and rights afforded by the original FAA agreement. 
The Exchange Offer explicitly warned creditors that their FAA bonds would likely 
remain in default indefinitely and that failure to tender FAA bonds would likely result in 
forfeiture of any payment pursuant to the original agreement.19 Essentially, the Exchange 
offer gave creditors an ultimatum: either agree to the terms of the restructuring or face the 
likelihood of nonpayment on Argentina’s prior obligations.   
To strengthen the threat, Argentina’s legislature passed a “Lock Law” prohibiting 
the Executive branch from making new exchange offers or settling on the FAA bonds in 
or out of court.20 The Lock Law also required that the FAA bonds be removed from 
foreign securities markets and exchanges. After the exchange offer closed in June of 
                                                
15 Id.  
16 Pamela Druckerman, Argentina Hasn’t Exempted IMF From Moratorium on Paying Debts, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 4, 2002, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB101009064044793320.html.  
17 See NML Capital Ltd., 699 F.3d at 251. 
18 Id at 252.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
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2005, 76% of the outstanding FAA bonds had been exchanged pursuant to the 
restructuring.21  
Argentina suspended the Lock Law in 2010 in an attempt to exchange the 
remaining 24% of FAA bonds for the restructured bonds.22 The terms of the second 
restructuring were virtually identical, including a warning that outstanding FAA 
securities may remain in default indefinitely. After the second exchange offer, less than 
9% of the 1994 FAA bonds remained outstanding.23 Until the time of an injunction by the 
Second Circuit in February of 2012, Argentina paid all of its debt obligations to the 
restructured bondholders, but did not make payments to the remaining FAA bonds 
(hereinafter referred to as “holdouts”).  
Between 2009 and 2011, the plaintiffs in NML Capital v. Argentina filed suits for 
injunctive relief pursuant to the pari passu clause and Equal Treatment Provision within 
the FAA. The plaintiffs sought to enforce the Equal Treatment Provision by suspending 
payments to bonds issued pursuant to the 2005 and 2010 Exchange Offers, without also 
making payments on the earlier FAA debt. The plaintiffs (holdouts) argued that making 
payments to the restructured debt while not also making payments to the earlier debt 
violates the Equal Treatment Provision, which states that the FAA debt “shall at all times 
rank at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated 
external indebtedness.” By failing to make payments to its earlier debt obligations, the 
holdouts argued that Argentina failed to meet its contractual obligations and subordinated 
the FAA debt.  
B. Issues and Arguments 
                                                
21 Id at 253. 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
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1. Meaning of the pari passu clause and equal treatment provision 
In response to the plaintiff’s allegations, Argentina made the same substantive 
claim twice, first in the Southern District of New York before Judge Thomas Griesa, and 
a second time before the United States District Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
before Judge Barrington Parker.  Argentina’s argument was that the clause against 
subordination referred only to formal, legal subordination. Subordination, they argued, 
only occurred when a sovereign created discriminatory legal rankings and gave certain 
legal priorities to other classes of debt.24 Applying this interpretation, Argentina argued 
that it did not subordinate the FAA debt by making payments to the Exchange Offer debt, 
because the sovereign did not alter the “legal ranking” of the two relative to each other.25  
The plaintiffs’ argument was based on an alternate interpretation of the clause. 
Subordination, they argued, referred to both legal and de facto subordination.26 By this 
standard, Argentina’s decision to make payments to the restructured debt and not to the 
FAA debt did constitute subordination, as it provided benefits (payments) to one class of 
debt that it did not provide to another. 27  
Judge Thomas Griesa of the United States District Court of the Southern District 
of New York agreed with the plaintiffs, holding Argentina’s de facto subordination 
violated the pari passu clause in the FAA.28 Upon appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed 
that holding.29 Judge Parker held that while the plaintiffs’ more liberal interpretation of 
the pari passu clause was the correct interpretation, Argentina would be found in 
                                                
24 Id at 256-257.  
25 Id.  
26 Id at 258.  
27 Id.  
28 Id at 256 
29 Id at 265.  
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violation by either standard.30 Even under the more stringent “legal subordination” 
standard, Argentina would still be in default.31 By enacted legislation prohibiting 
payments pursuant to the FAA, the sovereign created a legal designation between classes 
of debt, one of which was denied payment through legislative action. 32 
2. Remedy 
Notwithstanding the factual dispute as to whether Argentina subordinated the 
FAA debt, Argentina’s second argument attacked the remedy awarded by the Southern 
District of New York. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ request and required 
Argentina specific performance on the contract.33 In the context of this case, that specific 
performance took the form of an injunction and enforcement of the pari passu clause. 
The injunction prohibited Argentina from making payments to the exchange offer debt 
without also making payments to the FAA debt.34 However, Argentina argued that 
specific performance violated the terms agreed upon in the FAA because the agreement 
contained an acceleration clause. The acceleration clause provided that in the event of 
default, Argentina should pay damages to its creditors equal to the full amount it owed. 35  
While it may seem counterintuitive that Argentina would argue for enforcement of the 
acceleration clause, which would require substantial payment to the holdouts, Argentina 
knew such a remedy would be unenforceable against a sovereign.  
                                                
30 Id at 260.  
31 Id. 
32 Id.  
33 Id at 255-256. Note that in this context, specific performance did not mean that Argentina was required to 
make payments. The court awarded specific performance with respect to the equal treatment provision, and 
enjoined payment to the restructured debt without also paying the holdouts.  
34 Note: the formula for calculating how payments should be made (pro rata, full, equal quantity) was 
remanded and is the subject of the current appeal. If upheld, the Southern District of New York’s decision 
would require Argentina to make a “ratable payment” to the holdouts and would enjoin third parties from 
executing payments to holders of restructured debt.  
35 NML Capital Ltd., 699 F.3d at 251. 
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award of injunctive 
relief and specific performance.36 The court noted that although the FAA did contain an 
acceleration clause, New York law allowed the court to award other forms of relief when 
equitable and necessary and when not explicitly prohibited by the contract. 37 
While the contract clearly did not contain a prohibition against specific 
performance, the court of appeals did have to address the issue of whether specific 
performance was equitable and necessary. On this point, the Second Circuit reviewed the 
district court’s ruling and applied a “clear abuse of discretion” standard.38 To address the 
question of necessity, the court observed that through the Lock Law, Argentina made 
clear its intention not to comply with legal decisions that provide monetary relief to 
holders of FAA debt.  Because of its status as a sovereign, Argentina could follow 
through with that intention. Thus, the court held that an alternate remedy was necessary 
for the plaintiffs.39 When assessing the equity of such a decision, the court used a balance 
of equities approach.  Again, the court noted that because of its status as a sovereign 
nation, Argentina would be able to violate its contractual obligations with impunity 
because a US Court could not force the Argentine government to make a payment.40  
Because a monetary award was unavailable, the appellate court held that lower courts 
should afford relief to plaintiffs through other judicial avenues that they could enforce 
and would serve the court’s equitable purpose.41 
                                                
36 Id at 265. 
37 Id at 261, citing Guiness Harp Corp v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1980). See 
also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (noting that “the balance of equities and 
consideration of the public interest are pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, 
preliminary or permanent.”). 
38 Id at 257.  
39 Id at 262. 
40 Id at 263. 
41 Id at 262. 
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However, on appeal, Argentina argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) barred US courts from requiring the country to pay plaintiffs with immune 
property located outside the US.42 Section 1609 of the FSIA states that “the property in 
the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment and arrest and 
execution.”43 Likewise, the appellate opinion notes that courts are barred from granting 
“by injunction, relief which they may not provide by attachment.”44 In response, Judge 
Barrington asserted that the injunction would not violate section 1609 of the FSIA, 
because none of Argentina’s property would be “attached, arrested, or executed.” Rather, 
the injunction works through third parties such as intermediary banks to prohibit payment 
from traveling from Argentina to holders of the exchange offer debt. 45 Thus, none of 
Argentina’s property was affected by the decision.46 Yet, the injunction had the effect of 
prohibiting Argentine funds from moving to exchange offer creditors if Argentina did not 
also make payments to FAA debt.  
                                                
42 Id at 257. 
43 28 U.S.C.A. § 1609 (West 2013). 
44 Id.  
45 NML Capital Ltd., 699 F.3d at 263. Note: How third parties and intermediaries would be affected by the 
injunction was a topic to be clarified upon remand to the Southern District of New York.  
46 Id.  
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PART II: THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SOVEREIGN DEBT 
 
 The arguments Argentina made in response to the holdout creditor’s allegations 
are illustrative of the general problems associated with sovereign debt. The first set of 
problems address the ability of creditors to bring claims against debtors because of their 
status as sovereign entities.  
A. Immunity under the Act of State Doctrine or Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) 
 Disputes against sovereigns are generally subject to two important principles of 
American and International law: the Act of State Doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA).  
 The Act of State Doctrine generally holds that US courts should not pass 
judgment on the actions of a sovereign state acting through its governmental bodies. As 
stated in Underhill v. Hernandez,  
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other 
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts 
of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances 
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of 
by sovereign powers as between themselves.47  
 
It seems logical that a state’s financial decisions, such as whether to issue bonds and 
whether to default on said bonds, would fall within the protection of the act of state 
doctrine. If so, sovereign bondholders would be left helpless in the event of sovereign 
default, even if the circumstances that led to the default were completely within the 
control of the sovereign.  
 While the Act of State doctrine has significant implications for sovereign 
immunity and international law generally, the reasoning behind the doctrine is actually 
                                                
47 Underhill v. Hernandz, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
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grounded in the concept of separation of powers.48 Recognizing that the doctrine’s 
purpose is to safeguard the powers of the executive branch from judicial encroachment in 
matters of foreign affairs, it is not surprising that the doctrine is not a major concern with 
respect to sovereign debt. The judicial branch will only apply the Act of State Doctrine to 
matters affecting foreign affairs, as those are enumerated powers of the executive branch. 
However, sovereign debt disputes are contractual in nature, not foreign affairs. Therefore, 
the Act of State Doctrine will rarely be used to afford the executive exclusive control 
over sovereign debt disputes, as sovereign debt is not wholly within the realm of foreign 
affairs. Thus, sovereign debt disputes avoid being barred from judicial action by the Act 
of State Doctrine.  
 A much more relevant concern is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 
Codified in 28 U.S.C.A. §1604, the FSIA grants foreign states judicial immunity from 
proceedings in the courts of the United States.49 However, this immunity is subject to 
certain exceptions, including an exception for a sovereign acting with a commercial 
purpose.50 In a case unrelated to the NML Capital dispute, the Supreme Court in held that 
an earlier Argentine default on sovereign bonds did fall within the commercial activities 
                                                
48 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (“The text of the Constitution does not 
require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the 
validity of foreign acts of state. The act of state doctrine does, however, have ‘constitutional’ 
underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of 
separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement 
particular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations. The doctrine as formulated in past 
decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the 
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself 
and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”) 
49 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West 2013). 
50 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604(a)(2) (West 2013) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case… in which the action is based upon a commercial 
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of 
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes 
a direct effect in the United States.”). 
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exception.51 Further, because the default occurred within the sovereign’s territory (and 
thus outside the US courts’ jurisdiction), the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the 
default also had a “direct effect” in the United States. The court liberally construed the 
direct effect requirement and held that because the place of payment was New York, the 
Argentine default had a direct effect in the United States.52  
 However, if a sovereign wished to avoid the reach of US courts, it would not be 
difficult to do so.  By making the payments to intermediaries outside of the United States, 
a sovereign default would still fall within a commercial exception, but would fail the 
requisite direct effects test. Indeed, making payments to intermediaries is a very common 
practice in the sovereign debt market. However, few sovereign debtors choose this shield 
from US courts. In fact, most do not attempt to escape US judicial reach at all and 
explicitly accept US or foreign jurisdiction.  
 Rather than avoid foreign judicial reach, most sovereign debtors take a different 
approach entirely and waive their right to immunity under the FSIA.53  Ex ante, this 
waiver sends a message to potential creditors that the sovereign intends to stand 
accountable for its debt and is willing to submit to the American judicial system for 
adjudication in the event of default. With this kind of assurance in place, creditors are 
willing to lend to the sovereign at a lower interest rate because they perceive the risk to 
be mitigated by the ability to seek judicial recourse.  
                                                
51 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). 
52 Id. at 618-619. 
53 Panizza et. al., The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
LITERATURE, Vol. 47, No. 3, (Sept., 2009) (“… such waivers are in fact routinely included in bond 
covenants. As a result, under U.S. law (and that of several other major jurisdictions), sovereign immunity 
no longer plays an important role in shielding sovereign debtors from creditor suits.”) 
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 Thus, two doctrines that would prevent creditors from bringing suits against 
defaulting sovereign debtors are rendered virtually irrelevant in modern debt 
conveyances. However, the FSIA presents a more substantial challenge in the context of 
enforcing and awarding judicial remedies.  
B. Attachment/ Enforcement of Judicial Awards 
While it is common to for a sovereign to waive its right to judicial immunity under 
§1604, the FSIA provides other protections to sovereigns against enforcement of US 
judicial decisions. Because courts cannot enforce judicial awards over assets that are not 
subject to the court’s jurisdiction, sovereign assets located outside of the US are generally 
unavailable for adjudicatory remedies. Moreover, the FSIA even shields sovereign assets 
located within the United States from “attachment, arrest, and execution.”54 Although 
debt instruments typically waive the sovereign’s judicial immunity, a waiver of judicial 
immunity under §1604 does not imply a waiver of asset protection under  §1609.55 
However, just as the general provision for judicial immunity contains a commercial 
activities exception56, so too does the protection against attachment.57 Sovereign assets 
used for commercial activities are excluded from the FSIA’s asset protection under 
§1610.58 Stated differently, a sovereign’s assets being used for governmental functions 
                                                
54 28 U.S.C.A. § 1609. 
55 Walters v. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F. 3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 2011) (“…the 
FSIA's provisions governing jurisdictional immunity, on the one hand, and execution immunity, on the 
other, operate independently. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
explains, this means that “a waiver of immunity from suit does not imply a waiver of immunity from 
attachment of property, and a waiver of immunity from attachment of property does not imply a waiver of 
immunity from suit.”). 
56 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604. 
57 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610. 
58 28 U.S.C.A § 1610 (West 2013) (“The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in 
section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from 
judicial attachment in aid of execution…”). 
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are immune from attachment, but if a sovereign is acting in its capacity as a commercial 
actor, assets used for such purposes are not afforded FSIA protection.  
In the zenith of state-supported industry, a court may have found it easy to 
identify sovereign assets being used for commercial purchases. However, industries have 
become increasingly private in recent decades. Sovereigns have relatively few 
commercial assets, and even fewer assets located within the jurisdiction of US courts. 
The FSIA’s exemption for attachment thus creates a difficult dilemma in which courts 
can adjudicate against a sovereign but are unable to award a monetary judgment for 
damages. Thus, courts have had to work around this problem by issuing different forms 
of remedies that often implicate and adversely affect third parties.  
C. Third Party Interests  
This predicament described above is one-reason third parties often become key 
players and parties of interest in sovereign debt disputes. For example, in the NML 
Capital case against Argentina, the court was unable to award monetary damages to the 
holdout creditors. Instead, it was forced to issue an injunction prohibiting Argentina from 
performing on other contracts (the Exchange Offer bonds) without also performing on the 
FAA bonds. This implication for third parties is obviously less desirable, as it adversely 
affects other economic actors who would otherwise be unaffected by a holdout dispute 
between a sovereign and its creditors. Thus, the FSIA protects sovereign assets but at the 
expense of third parties.  
This will likely be a problem in all sovereign debt disputes. Courts would like to 
penalize a sovereign who breaches a contractual obligation. The ability to do so would 
properly align the interests of the sovereign and creditors. However, the FSIA prohibits 
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courts from enforcing this remedy. Rather, courts are forced to issue injunctions and 
alternative remedies whose effect is most harmful to third parties, such as other creditors 
and financial intermediaries. In this respect, Argentina’s default is illustrative. Some of 
the parties most concerned with the litigation and the Second Circuit’s opinion are parties 
not directly involved with the litigation. Financial intermediaries like New York  Mellon 
Corp, the indenture trustee for the restructured bonds, submitted amicus briefs throughout 
the NML Capital litigation. One of the issues on remand, and now before the Second 
Circuit, is how a ruling in favor of the holdout creditors can be enforced against third 
parties.  
D. General Collective Action Problems 
When a sovereign becomes unable to meet its debt obligations, it typically will 
attempt to restructure its debt to extend the period over which payments are made or 
lower the premiums paid. However, at the first sign of insolvency, each creditor has an 
individual incentive to renegotiate the terms of his or her holdings to get the most 
favorable terms at the expense of his counterparties. Each individual creditor has an 
incentive structure that is divergent from the best interest of the entire class of debt. This 
is the classic collective action problem. To mitigate this problem, sovereigns will 
typically offer a uniform exchange, as Argentina did in 2005 and 2010.  
When one examines this collective action problem in the context of sovereign 
debt restructuring, it becomes evident why the decision in NML Capital v. Argentina is so 
significant. If courts recognize the rights of holdouts to enforce the original terms of the 
debt issue, they create a significant incentive for creditors to decline debt restructurings in 
order to enforce the more favorable terms of the initial offering. On the other hand, if 
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courts refuse to enforce the original terms of the debt, they will give sovereigns the right 
to unilaterally force modified terms on their creditors. Stated differently, courts would 
prohibit creditors and sovereign debtors from “bargaining in the shadow of the law,” 
because the sovereign knows that the law will not force them to abide by the initial terms 
of their contracts.    
E. Pari Passu 
The primary question concerned in the NML Capital litigation was over the 
interpretation of the pari passu clause, and the meaning of the Equal Treatment 
Provision. However, before discussing the interpretation or meaning of these provisions, 
it is appropriate to understand where they came from and why they are present in 
sovereign debt contracts.  
When a private (non-sovereign) actor issues bonds or another form of debt, that 
issuer presents potential investors with a decision in risk allocation. There is a chance that 
the issuer will default on its promise to pay the bonds later. In the corporate context, there 
is a possibility that the value of the firm’s debt obligations will surpass the value of its 
current assets or assets it can generate in the foreseeable future. When a corporation or 
firm finds itself in this situation, the borrower and its assets can be liquidated through 
bankruptcy. At liquidation, its assets are converted into cash, and that cash is distributed 
to creditors. However, lenders have long recognized that the priority for cash 
disbursements in liquidation is important.  Thus, the pari passu clause evolved as a 
mechanism to ensure that, in the event of liquidation, creditors are treated equally and are 
paid on a pro rata basis. This is especially important when the corporation has the ability 
to issue new debt with different contractual terms. The pari passu clause ensured that no 
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new debt would be given priority over more senior debt, and vice versa, between the 
borrower and other creditors. 
However, a sovereign state cannot be liquidated. In essence, sovereigns are 
protected as “permanent going concerns.” This presents an important question: if a 
sovereign is not subject to liquidation, what is the purpose of the pari passu clause in 
sovereign debt contracts?59 If there is never a possibility that the assets of a sovereign 
will be liquidated, what protections, if any, does the clause provide investors or debtors in 
the sovereign debt context? These questions are garnering substantial attention in today’s 
economic literature. But the precise legal meaning of pari passu is outside of this paper’s 
scope. It is the manner in which these clauses are enforced and the economic 
ramifications of their enforcement that is most relevant for this paper’s consideration. 
                                                
59 Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott attempt to answer this question in their book, THE THREE AND A HALF 
MINUTE TRANSACTION. The authors argue that because sovereigns are not subject to liquidation the pari 
passu clause is a largely archaic term that has become boilerplate language in modern sovereign debt 
contracts. Through their book, the authors argue that such boilerplate language has a tendency to outlive its 
useful purpose because of the structure of law firms and the rate at which contracts are created. See 
generally, MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION (2013). 
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PART III: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING A SOVEREIGN DEBT SOLUTION OR SYSTEM 
 
The preceding section outlined the problems and challenges that sovereign debt 
presents and the following section will analyze legal and political responses that may 
mitigate the problems. However, before proceeding to that analysis, it is necessary to 
articulate the socially desirable goals and features that any remedy or system should 
encompass. These aims should serve as a metric for assessing the feasibility, 
effectiveness, and desirability of any changes to the sovereign debt system. 
From an efficiency and societal wealth-maximizing perspective, any system or 
solution affecting sovereign debt should have a few main objectives. Choi, Gulati, and 
Posner provide a helpful structure through which to frame the analysis.60 First, they note 
that sovereigns always exist in one of two states.61 The first, they call the “good state,” 
characterized by economic health and the ability to pay debts.62 On the other hand, the 
“bad state,” results from external or internal economic hardships and results in the 
sovereign’s inability to pay its debts.63  As the authors note, one primary difficulty with 
sovereign debt contracts is the difficulty for investors to distinguish between sovereigns 
in good states and sovereigns in bad state. They assert that sovereign debt contracts have 
several goals, many of which are also applicable for a resolution of the sovereign debt 
problem outlined above. The authors note that these goals should be to 
Encouraging sovereigns to repay in the good state; enabling value-increasing 
restructurings in bad states; preventing debtors from seeking to exploit divisions 
among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; and 
                                                
60 Stephen J. Choi, et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
131, 132 (2012). 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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preventing debtors from taking risks in order to externalize the cost of default on 
creditors. 64 
  
Like sovereign debt contracts generally, any resolution to the sovereign debt dilemma 
should also seek to achieve the goals mentioned by Choi, Gulati, and Posner. Namely,  
such a system should encourage restructuring in “bad states” so that each creditor can 
recover as much of their original investment as possible.  
 However, it should be clear that restructuring is not always a socially optimal 
solution. Indeed, holdouts should and do serve an important purpose in the context of 
sovereign debt restructuring. Without a system of rights and obligations owed to holdout 
creditors, sovereigns would have no incentive to negotiate in good faith with their 
creditors. Likewise, sovereigns in the “good state” may find it easy to behave 
opportunistically and force a restructuring when it is not absolutely necessary in order to 
eliminate their burden to meet its debt obligations. 65 In this respect, holdout rights serve 
as the backbone to good faith negotiation. This is often referred to as negotiating “in the 
shadow of the law.”  
 To summarize, any external mechanism or judicially created solution to the 
sovereign debt problem should create the incentive for creditors to undertake good-faith 
restructuring negotiations with a sovereign who cannot meet its obligations (i.e., is in a 
“bad state”) and should deter such restructuring when a sovereign is financially healthy.  
                                                
64 Id at 133.  
65 Id at 132.  
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PART IV: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE SOVEREIGN DEBT DILEMMA 
 
The problems outlined in Part II present a number of questions and very few 
answers. How, if at all, will the dilemma of sovereign debt be resolved? Does the solution 
to the problems outlined above lie within the reach of the US Judiciary? Could an 
external institution, such as the International Monetary Fund provide a mechanism or 
solution to remedy the problems with the sovereign debt market? Should creditors and 
debtors create new and innovative contractual provisions to govern future contracts? 
Likewise, are there mechanisms utilized in other areas of law amenable to sovereign debt 
contracts? Should actors within the sovereign debt market look outside the law 
completely and rely on a traditional interest rate regime to monitor sovereign debt 
transactions? This section will present and evaluate some of these ideas and questions. 
A. Allow Interest Rates to Regulate 
One may wonder why any external action, judicial or otherwise, is necessary to 
regulate sovereign bonds at all. After all, one of the first lessons in any economics course 
is the trade-off between risk and reward. Investors require a higher return or premium on 
investments that they perceive to be more risky. Therefore, government bonds, which 
have traditionally been thought to be the most secure and “safe” of all investments, 
typically carry a very low rate of interest. However, investors with the same risk 
preferences will demand a substantially higher return for equity investments in the stock 
of publicly traded corporations, because these investments are thought to be riskier than 
government bonds. Some may reasonably argue that this basic economic principle should 
be sufficient to govern the sovereign debt market. Stated succinctly, the complete risk 
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associated with any security should be adequately reflected by the premium or interest 
rate the particular security offers an investor. 
If a security’s return were sufficient to regulate the sovereign debt market, bonds 
of countries with a high risk of default would offer a substantially higher market premia 
than those from more secure countries. Additionally, markets would be quick to adjust to 
new market information. When a country’s economic outlook became less certain, its 
bonds would exchange for discounts on secondary markets and new bond issues would 
have to offer greater interest rates to lenders. In this way, investors could choose 
investments that meet their risk preferences. Sovereign bonds with a  high risk of default 
would be rated like “junk bonds,” but would offer risk-taking investors substantial 
premia. In theory, this premium over more secure bonds would fully encompass the 
added risk of default. Rather than seeking judicial awards, investors would simply incur 
the loss associated with their risky investment as they do when they buy equity 
investments. 
 However, bond markets do not operate so efficiently. It seems as though the 
sovereign debt market operates with significant market distortions and informational 
asymmetries. Sovereign debt offers judicial recourse (the effectiveness of this recourse is 
debatable) making the interest rates and similar measures of return in sovereign debt 
contracts much less effective than in equity investments. Further, the risk of a sovereign 
debt investment is often unknown ex ante. Stated differently, it is often the case that a 
sovereign must default before an investor is fully aware of the risk associated with the 
sovereign.  This is supported by research that shows that bond spreads increase after 
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default shocks, not leading up to them.66 Further, the information about an investment in 
a sovereign bond is skewed by the possibility of a third-party insurer, such as the IMF or 
in the case of Europe, a monetary union.67 This information asymmetry undermines the 
effectiveness of bond markets as information forcing mechanisms. Further, research has 
shown that sovereign bond interest rates are often tied more to the business cycle and 
worldwide macroeconomic factors than the specific risk associated with the sovereign 
issuing the bonds.68 Thus, as is often the case in economic questions, if more information 
could be reflected in the market ex ante, interest rates may have a higher likelihood of 
providing an adequate policing mechanism for sovereign debt. However, macroeconomic 
uncertainty and the unique legal status of sovereign bonds make interest rates alone 
insufficient to regulate the market for sovereign debt.  
B. Create a new “International Financial Architecture” or “Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM) 
 
Perhaps the most controversial solution to the sovereign debt problem has been a 
proposal by Anne Krueger of the International Monetary Fund. Recognizing that 
domestic bankruptcy courts provided a convenient an effective tool to solve the collective 
action problem for private, domestic workouts, the IMF proposed a similar system for 
sovereign states in 2001.69 Rather than outline a detailed proposal for how a system 
would operate, Krueger made a generalized assessment regarding the problems with 
sovereign debt, such as the collective action problem and the danger of opportunistic 
                                                
66 Cristina Arellano, Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies, 98 AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 690, 691 (2008).  
67 See discussion of Syndications and Third-Party Insurers below.  
68 Mark Aguiar & Gita Gopinath, Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates, and the Current Account, 69 J. OF INT’L 
ECON. 64, 82 (2006) (“… making interest rates relatively less sensitive to the amount borrowed and 
relatively more sensitive to the realization of the shock.”). 
69 Anne Krueger,  First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address Before the 
National Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner (November 26, 2001).  
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holdouts.70 Krueger suggested that the IMF could lend its strong institutional support for 
countries struggling to effectively restructure their debt obligations. Moreover, she noted 
that the IMF already undertakes substantial monitoring efforts when countries are within 
the IMF’s assistance program and are in danger of default.71 These monitoring efforts are 
necessary to ensure a defaulting sovereign does not engage in opportunistic fiscal policy. 
The IMF’s unique position would allow the institution to alleviate the burden on 
individual creditors to monitor a defaulting sovereign’s actions. Krueger’s proposal 
outlined four key goals of a future sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM): (1) 
preventing holdout creditors from disrupting good-faith negotiations, (2) providing 
creditors with a  guarantee that the debtor country will act responsibly during the “stand 
still” period,  (3) providing financial support and guarantees to private lenders who will 
need additional incentive to cooperate with and make loans to a defaulting sovereign, and 
(4) binding minority creditors to a restructuring agreement once it has been agreed to by a 
large enough majority.72 Likewise, Krueger hoped that such a system would rarely be 
utilized, but would rather provide a predictable and well-developed operation, such that 
debtors and investors would be able to reach a mutually beneficial solution by negotiating 
“in the shadow of the law,” not in court.73 Some believe that a SDRM would afford 
creditors more rights and bridge the disparity in bargaining leverage between sovereigns 
and their lenders.74 
While some have been quick to defend Krueger’s SDRM proposal, others have 
                                                
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333, 343 
(2005). 
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argued that the implementation of such a program faces too many challenges and has too 
many inherent flaws to be practicable.75 As a primary concern, many have noted that 
sovereigns are unwilling to cede control over a workout process to any third party and 
will continue to refuse to relinquish complete autonomy absent a better incentive to do 
so.76 Others alleged that an IMF controlled system would limit the bargaining power of 
creditors and would be an “efficient medium through which the geopolitical wishes of the 
G-7 governments could be imposed on private sector lenders.”77 However, such leverage 
affects both sides of the creditor-debtor equation, as the ability to impose an economic 
standstill upon a sovereign would give the IMF substantial leverage over creditors, but 
also significant power over the autonomy of sovereigns.78 Critics like Celeste Boeri have 
found problems with the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) even 
more numerous: 
There are three main problems with the IMF's statutory approach. First, it could 
potentially be applied retroactively to debt already incurred under different terms. 
Second, the costs of administration and enforcement may exceed the benefits. 
Third, it generates confusion over the IMF's role in the world order as a lender of 
last resort, not a sovereign debt manager.79 
Finally, some have pointed to the recent “successes” of cases like Argentina, to illustrate 
that “borrowers and lenders can work out bond defaults on their own.”80 However, the 
description of sovereign debt problems above and the ongoing struggle between 
                                                
75 LEX REIFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY (Brookings 
Institution Press 2003), See Generally Ch. 11.  
76 A. Michele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J. 
997, 1020 (2004). 
77 Buchheit, supra note 74, at 343.  
78 Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order nor Chaos: The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 
EMORY L. J. 657, 676 (2004). 
79 Celeste Boeri, How to Solve Argentina’s Debt Crisis: Will the IMF’s Plan Work?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 245, 
253-254 (2003). 
80 Buchheit, supra note 77, quoting Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Americas: Argentina’s Lessons for Global 
Creditors, WALL. ST. J A15 (Mar 4, 2005).  
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Argentina and its creditors render this characterization as a “success” quite questionable. 
Even Krueger’s general proposal highlighted a fair number of questions such a system 
would present, such as the legal basis for such a mechanism and how the IMF would be 
able to enforce the policies set forth through any plan. 81 
Recently, the emergence of the Collective Action Clause (discussed below) has 
eclipsed continued efforts towards a SDRM. Particularly, United States’ recent aversion 
to such an effort has led many to conclude that the SDRM proposition is completely off 
of the table: 
The IMF’s SDRM received a substantial blow during the fund’s spring meeting of 
2003. During this meeting, Treasury secretary John Snow cited markets moves 
toward collective action clauses and concluded that it was “neither necessary nor 
feasible to continue working on SDRM.” In fact, this pronouncement by Secretary 
Snow has caused at least one source to declare that the SDRM is “officially dead.”82 
 
C. Escrow and Neutral Third Parties 
The use of escrows is an investment protection technique that has proven useful in 
dealing with sovereign counterparties in the context of joint ventures.  This tool is 
premised on the idea that a sovereign cannot expropriate funds that are automatically held 
outside of its borders in foreign bank accounts. Thus, by channeling funds directly to a 
foreign third-party, investors in a foreign joint venture agreement can minimize the 
political risk associated with conducting business with a sovereign. Because sovereign 
debt agreements also contain political risk, this mechanism may be an effective tool to 
utilize in sovereign debt contracts. However, this contractual tool has not been tested or 
analyzed in the academic literature.  
                                                
81 Krueger, supra note 65.   
82 Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or Contractual Solutions, 152 PENN. 
L. REV. 1483, 1484 (2004). 
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In the context of sovereign bonds, the funds that are in danger of unjust 
expropriation are internal tax revenues owed to creditors under the terms of sovereign 
bond contracts. In theory, the terms of a bond offering could specify that the requisite tax 
revenues to meet a country’s debt obligations could be directly deposited into a third-
party escrow immediately after collection. If effective, this would eliminate the 
possibility that a sovereign could reallocate the revenues to internal projects or make 
preferential payments to its domestic debt holders.  In theory, the escrow would 
undertake those responsibilities and allocation decisions.83 
However, the problems that are concerns for sovereign debt are not completely 
eliminated by the use of escrows and third parties. Tax revenues collected by the national 
treasury could easily be expropriated prior to being channeled to the escrow. While this 
would violate the terms of the bond contract, this seems of little consequence from the 
perspective of a sovereign. Often the actions that lead to a sovereign default are also 
against the terms of its bond contracts, but internal considerations often outweigh 
obligations to debtors, causing the countries to willfully breach. However, contrary to a 
domestic contract breach where both parties are subject to the same jurisdiction, 
contractual breaches in the sovereign context provide limited opportunities for creditor 
recourse. Furthermore, just as there is a concern about yielding control of a sovereign’s 
affairs in the context of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, it seems probable 
that these same concerns would be raised if a country were asked to submit its tax 
revenue decisions to a neutral third-party. Since bond terms are authored by issuing 
                                                
83 For an overview of Joint Ventures Agreements as a means of political risk mitigation, see generally, 
Frederick J. Phillips-Patrick, Political Risk and Organizational Form, 34 J. OF L. AND ECON., 675 (1991). 
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countries, it is even less likely that a sovereign would willfully cede control over tax 
revenues by offering this type of arrangement.  
D. Syndication and Third Party Guarantees 
 
Another possible means by which creditors could be afforded protection in the 
context of sovereign debt is through syndication or third-party guarantees. Under this 
process, third parties such as the IMF or another sovereign could act as an insurer of an 
issuing country’s sovereign debt. Such an arrangement would have the effect of lowering 
the interest rate demanded by investors and increasing the security of their loan. In the 
event of default, another party would be tied to the investment, providing an alternate 
source for investment recovery.  
To some extent, a process like this already exists in practice. The IMF often 
provides financial assistance to struggling sovereigns in order to help avoid default.84 The 
IMF is able to make temporary, interest free loans to countries in financial distress and 
can also lend needed liquidity through “Stand-By Arrangements,” in which the IMF acts 
as the guarantor of loans made to the distressed country.  In exchange for such support, 
the IMF imposes certain market-based regulations on the distressed sovereign. In this 
way, the IMF acts similarly to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to 
regulate and stabilize investments, but on an international scale. However, the IMF’s 
refusal to continue support for Argentina in its darkest hour in December of 2001 is 
illustrative of why the IMF alone cannot secure the entire sovereign debt system.85 The 
IMF provides support for distressed sovereigns that behave according to its market-based 
rules. However, many sovereigns do not abide by market-based standards for conduct and 
                                                
84 The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2001  
85 Id.  
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often their conduct has led them to the default in the first place. Thus, the IMF provides a 
helpful form of investment protection, but only to a limited degree.  Further, once default 
has occurred, the IMF ceases to be useful as a source of investment recovery.  
Likewise, the European Union’s economic and monetary integration has created a 
similar mechanism within the Euro-zone. The recent Cyprus bailout has shown that deep 
economic and monetary integration between nations can serve as an impetus for bailouts 
by stronger economies. However, this arrangement has been far from successful. If 
anything, the Cyprus debt debacle and future concerns about Greece, Italy, and Spain 
have cast serious doubt on the long-term viability of the European Union. It seems 
increasingly unlikely that countries like Germany will repeatedly agree to costly bailouts 
to maintain the financial stability of its currency. There is also concern that deep 
integration can lead to the moral hazard problem, where a sovereign undertakes 
substantially more risk because at least some of the burden is spread among its 
counterparties. Fiscally responsible countries derive little benefit from economic 
integration when less-responsible countries are able to take advantage of their strong 
economies and rely on them for bailouts.   
E. Collective Action Clauses and Uniform Action Clauses 
 
The mechanism that has seen the most widespread success is a private contractual 
solution known as the Collective Action Clause (CAC). As noted above, the prevalence 
and success of CAC’s have virtually eliminated the possibility of a Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism. Until recently, most sovereign bonds issued under New York 
law required unanimity to restructure the entire class of debt (Uniform Action Clauses, 
 30 
UAC’s).86 UAC’s force sovereigns to either persuade the entire class of bonds or 
negotiate restructuring efforts with each individual creditor. This standard exacerbated 
the collective action problem and allowed holdouts to behave opportunistically. However, 
bonds issued under the so called, “London Law” usually only required a supermajority of 
bondholders to agree for the restructured plan to be binding on the  entire class of debt 
(CAC’s).87 CAC’s have become standard features of sovereign debt contracts over the 
last decade.88 Since Mexico implemented a CAC in 2003, “virtually all” of new 
sovereign debt contracts have included a CAC, and the inclusion of these provisions has 
been dubbed the “Mexico Standard.”89 In theory, debt issued pursuant to this standard is 
much easier to restructure, as obtaining the consent of a supermajority can bind the entire 
class of debt and eliminate holdout creditors such as the NML Capital plaintiffs. While 
the precise threshold varies by country and across bond issues, 90 the required threshold is 
usually between 50% and 75%.91 
A variation on a minimum voting threshold is for CAC’s to appoint a trustee to 
negotiate on behalf of an entire class of debt. While formally distinct, this approach has 
the same effect on the collective action problem. Putting the task of restructuring 
decisions in the hands of a single actor (who is usually a member of the class and has 
similar interests to the class) serves to coordinate the efforts of disaggregated, interested 
parties.  
                                                
86 Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,  Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of 
Sovereign Bonds,  53 EMORY L. J.  929, 932 (2004). 
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J. Int’l L. 713 (2003). 
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90 Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 86.  
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However, CAC’s do not solve the problem entirely. In order to be effective, a 
sovereign must still be able to persuade the requisite threshold of debtors to agree to a 
restructuring proposal. Especially when this threshold is upwards of 75%, that is no small 
task. Perhaps most critically, the outcome of NML Capital could substantially handicap 
the ability of sovereigns to persuade creditors not to holdout. The Second Circuit’s 
decision to issue an injunction and effectively require Argentina to compensate to the 
holdouts may have adversely altered the incentive structure and encouraged creditors to 
holdout, rather than restructure. If so, sovereigns may have trouble executing future debt 
restructuring efforts, even with CAC’s in effect.  
 In short, the international community has failed to produce a viable solution for 
the sovereign debt conundrum. One argument against the IMF’s Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism was that actors have had recent “success stories” in 
independent negotiations. This argument alleges that a supranational mechanism is not 
necessary when actors can privately reach the same, effective resolution of disputes. In 
response, Lee Buchheit appropriately characterized this “success” as “a bit like 
concluding that World War I stands for the proposition that, left on their own, nationals 
can work out their differences.92 While the last decade has shown that sovereign debt 
restructurings are possible, few would call the recent efforts to restructure sovereign bond 
obligations a success. Negotiations are marred by holdouts, ongoing collective action 
problems, and an inability to enforce judicial awards against sovereigns. Thus, while the 
international community of scholars, investors, and financial institutions have proposed 
and discussed a number of solutions and remedies outlined above, none have proven 
effective or practicable. The state of affairs has not been substantially changed by these 
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proposals and mechanisms; sovereigns and investors are left to negotiate terms, 
restructure debts, and resolve disputes subject only to national judicial remedies.  
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PART V: JUDICIAL RESOLUTION ABSENT AN EXTERNAL MECHANISM 
As noted above, sovereign debt presents substantial obstacles for debtors, 
creditors, and courts. As the preceding section showed, the present legal environment has 
failed to provide an immediate panacea.  However, private remedies such as collective 
action clauses have become prominent in most sovereign debt agreements. While these 
clauses seem to alleviate the holdout problem for future debt restructurings, their 
effectiveness remains uncertain.  For reasons outlined below, the success of collective 
action clauses will be entirely dependent upon the judicial resolution of the dispute 
between NML Capital and Argentina and the subsequent behavior of the parties. 
 This section will first explain why the court’s decision in NML Capital is so 
critical to the future of sovereign debt. After explaining that the NML case will set 
precedential incentives for future debtors and creditors, the next subsection outlines the 
outcome alternatives for the case and the incentives created by each. Finally, this section 
concludes by making a normative argument that it is socially desirable for Argentina to 
default on its current debt obligations. 
A. Why the Judicial Outcome is Important 
 As noted in Part III, collective action clauses have become standard in sovereign 
debt agreements. By empowering a majority of debt-holders to agree to a debt 
restructuring on behalf of the entire class of debt, collective action clauses limit the 
ability of holdouts and vulture creditors to impede the restructuring process. However, 
the danger of holdout is not eliminated. There is always a chance that the requisite 
number of creditors will not agree to the restructuring. This would result in either the 
terms of the debt issuance remaining unchanged (no restructuring) or would result in the 
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same state of affairs as is present in the Argentina debt instruments, where the collective 
action clause is absent completely and the sovereign must obtain individual consent to 
restructuring. Therefore, the ability of a class of debt to meet the minimum threshold set 
by the collective action provision is of monumental importance to the clause’s 
effectiveness.  
This section will offer a model for examining how an individual will calculate a 
decision to accept a debt restructure. That model will be used to explain how the outcome 
of the NML Capital v. Argentina case could affect the decisions of future creditors to 
agree to restructuring terms. Finally, that analysis will be applied to CAC’s to show that 
the decisions following the NML Capital litigation have the ability to seriously handicap 
CAC provisions in future debt contracts.  
An individual debt holder’s decision to accept a restructuring agreement will 
depend upon her perception of the likely opportunity cost to doing so. In this parlance, 
the opportunity cost of restructuring is holding out. Stated differently, a holder of 
sovereign debt faced with the option to restructure will make an assessment of her 
expected utility under the terms of the restructure compared to her expected utility from 
holding out (not restructuring). This decision can be illustrated by the following model:  
 
 
 
In this model, the left side of the equation represents the expected value of holding out, 
while the right side represents the expected value of restructuring. P1 is the probability of 
receiving the full amount due under the original debt agreement (x). Initially, the model 
assumes that the only two outcomes are (1) receiving the full amount due (x), or (2) 
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receiving zero payments (z). Thus, the probability of not being compensated for a 
sovereign default at all is represented by 1-P1, because the two possibilities represent all 
possible outcomes. On the right side of the equation, the value to the creditor under the 
restructured debt agreement is represented by y, and the probabilities of being paid that 
amount or not being paid at all (z) are represented by P2 and 1-P2, respectively. Assuming 
that creditors are rational and behave in ways that maximize their expected utility, the 
model suggests that when the creditor perceives her expected pay-off after restructuring 
to be higher than holding out, she will choose to restructure. But when she perceives the 
restructuring opportunity to be less desirable (lower utility) than her current agreement, 
she will decline the proposed debt restructuring terms and opt to holdout. 
 It is important to note at this stage in the model that the term “perception” is a 
very important adjective with respect to the expected values for holding out and 
accepting the restructuring. Whether accurate or not, a creditors perception of her 
expected payoff is completely determinate of her decision. Thus, an incorrect assumption 
or a change in perceived likelihood of a particular outcome may disproportionately affect 
her decision.  
 With the model as the baseline, it is possible to explain why the majority of the 
creditors in the NML Capital case decided to accept the restructuring. Economic turmoil 
and a failing Argentine economy support the assumption that the probability of being 
paid in full pursuant to the original debt agreement was very low, if not zero (P1 =0). 
Further, Argentina’s affirmative agreement not to pay the outside debt reinforced the 
assumption that creditors holding the original debt agreements would not be paid. Thus, a 
creditor would likely accept any offer to restructure that carried with it a greater certainty 
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of payment.  If we assume that the perceived probability of being paid under the 
restructured debt agreement is .8 (there is still a chance Argentina will default on its  new 
debt agreements) and that the terms of the restructure are twenty-four cents on the dollar, 
a creditor’s assessment of options may have looked like this: 
 
 
 
Here, a creditor will accept an expected pay-off of less than twenty cents on the dollar (.8 
x $0.24 = $0.19) to her original investment because the likelihood of being paid if she 
does not restructure is zero. So if the expected value of the distribution under the original 
debt agreements was zero, why do any creditors ever hold?  
 The holdouts in the NML Capital case (apparently with good reason) perceived 
the chance of being paid through the original agreements as greater than zero. In the 
example above, if they believed they had at least a twenty percent chance of receiving a 
judicial award enforcing their original right to full payment, it would be in their best 
interest to hold out. This ex ante assessment is where perception and the outcome of NML 
Capital v. Argentina become critical. While many of the creditors perceived their chances 
of recovery by holding out as virtually zero, the holdouts perceived it to be higher. After 
the Second Circuit’s decision, it seems that the holdouts were correct, as the court is in 
the process of upholding their rights under the original agreement. In this way, the courts 
decision will substantially affect future debt holders’ cost-benefit analysis. If the decision 
is upheld, the Second Circuit’s holding would clearly assert that the probability of being 
compensated as a holdout is greater than zero. 
 37 
 Thus, the NML Capital outcome is significant for three important reasons. First, 
by upholding the rights of the hold out creditors, the court drastically affected the 
probability that holdout creditors will be paid (P1) by asserting that they have judicially 
enforceable rights when a sovereign makes payments to other debtors. Second, the 
court’s decision will also affect the expected quantity that holdout creditors (x) and 
creditors that agree to restructuring (y) can expect to receive. This second question, along 
with the status of third party intermediaries, is the question that was remanded to the 
District Court in the Second Circuit’s decision. Its precise outcome is still unknown. 
Finally, the court’s decision may ultimately affect the probability that a sovereign will 
make payments to restructured debt. The first effect (the increased rights of hold-out 
creditors) is most important for the purposes of this paper. However, the second and third 
reasons may also substantially affect the decision to restructure.  
1. Upholding the rights of hold-out creditors (P1) 
 While the final status of the NML Capital v. Argentina outcome is still 
undetermined, the Second Circuit’s decision confirmed the holding of the lower court and 
upheld the rights of the holdout creditors to seek damages pursuant to the original debt 
agreement. By upholding the pari passu clause and deciding that a sovereign debtor’s 
payments to restructured debt without payments to the original debt was de facto 
subordination, the court substantially affected the probabilities in the model above.  Prior 
to this decision, most creditors believed the probability of recovery for a holdout (P1) was 
virtually zero. However, the Second Circuit has revealed that is no longer a prudent 
assumption. Stated differently, creditors will now perceive their chances of recovering 
when they hold out as substantially higher than zero. So while the probability of recovery 
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if a creditor restructures is seemingly unaffected by the court’s decision,93 the probability 
of recovering if a creditor does not accept has increased substantially.  In the terms of the 
model, P1 is now a non-zero, positive probability. 
 The obvious effect of this decision will be to increase the number of holdouts 
when sovereigns try to restructure debt agreements. If a creditor believes she has a 
substantial likelihood of recovery under the original terms, her incentive to restructure 
falls relative to her incentive to holdout.  
2. An unknown change to the quantity of recovery (x and y; P1=P2) 
 The issue of damage calculation was one of the issues that the Second Circuit 
remanded to the district court. The Second Circuit asked the Judge Griesa to clarify the 
formula by which the payments to the original debt should be calculated relative to the 
payments made to the exchange debt. Judge Greisa explained that the amount Argentina 
would be required to pay to the holdouts is calculated relative to the amount being paid to 
the restructured debt. The “ratable payment” (x) due to the holdouts should be the 
“payment percentage” multiplied by the amount due to the holdouts. The payment 
percentage is calculated as the amount being paid to the exchange bonds divided by the 
amount due to the exchange debt. Thus, x is calculated as follows: 
 
It follows that in order to make full payments on the exchange debt, Argentina must fully 
compensate the remaining amount due under the original debt. With respect to the model, 
this decision inextricably links the amount paid to the original debt (x) and the amount 
                                                
93 This assertion is not necessarily true. As will be discussed later, upholding the rights of holdout creditors 
may substantially affect the probability that restructured debt will recover. However, at this stage, it is 
helpful to think of the two independently.  
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paid to the restructured debt (y) and holds a constant proportion between the two. If this 
calculation holds on appeal, it seems unlikely that a future creditor would ever willingly 
restructure. If a sovereign must pay an equal percentage of what it owes to the original 
debt and to the exchange debt, it would be against any actor’s interest to exchange an 
entitlement to full compensation (x=1) for a  fractional amount (y=.24) if the 
probabilities of recovery are also equal(P1=P2). The Second Circuit’s opinion suggests 
that these probabilities are also inextricably linked, as they held that payments could not 
be made to exchange debt without making the aforementioned ratable payments to the 
original debt. It is notable that this calculation is on appeal and has yet to be confirmed by 
the second circuit. However, if Judge Griesa’s holding stands, this calculation, perhaps 
even more so than the likelihood of payment absent exchange, will substantially decrease 
a creditor’s incentive to restructure debt and increase her incentive to holdout.  
3. A change to the probability of being paid if restructured (P2) 
The final effect that the NML Capital decision will have is a decrease in the 
probability of being paid the full amount promised under the terms of the debt 
restructure. Prior to the decision, Argentina regularly made its payments pursuant to the 
2005 and 2010 debt agreements. However, if the Republic wishes to continue to make 
these payments in full, it will have to also fully pay the original holders of the debt. This 
presents obvious problems, as Argentina did not have sufficient funds to pay the amount 
owed to the original debt, which is why they restructured. While the gross amount they 
will have to pay will be reduced by the percentage of creditors who accepted 
restructuring, the amount owed to the holdouts is still upwards of $1.3 Billion. Since it is 
unlikely that Argentina will be able to make full payments to both the holdout and the 
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restructured debt, it is likely that the Republic will have to make a proportional payment 
to both classes, marking a clear “win” for the holdouts and a clear loss for the 
restructured debt.  
As applied to the model above, the NML Capital decision (1) increased the 
probability of hold-out payment (P1) to a non-zero, positive amount, (2) linked the 
amount payable to holdout and restructured debt  (x and y) to a constant proportion 
(P1=P2), and (3) required the likelihood of payment to holdouts and restructured debt to 
be equal to one another. Thus, the decision has altered the ex ante decision model as 
follows:94  
 
Taken together, these three outcomes suggest the judicial decision in NML 
Capital will tend to incentivize more holdouts. In fact, the model seems to indicate that 
no creditors will accept restructuring agreements, as now it is never in an actor’s best 
interest to do so. The Second Circuit has required that the probability of payment for each 
be equal, as well as the fractional payment to each class. Thus, the only difference 
between the expected recovery for holdouts and restructured debt is the quantity 
Argentina agrees to pay each class. Because the whole point of restructuring debt is to 
alleviate a debtor’s burden, it would not make sense for the restructured terms to be 
higher than the original.95 Therefore, when faced with the decision of whether to 
restructure or holdout, a rational creditor will always holdout if the NML Capital changes 
go into effect.  
                                                
94 Where “r” is a fractional amount reflective of the required “payment percentage.” 
95 However, a debtor may be able to spread payments out and reduce its immediate financial burdens. If 
time considerations are controlling, a restructured debt agreement may result in a higher gross amount paid 
throughout the course of the debtor-creditor relationship, with the incremental payments shrinking.  
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However, collective action clauses are intended to allow for a majority of 
creditors to require the entire class of debt to restructure. Stated differently, they are 
intended to alleviate the holdout problem. But with the incentive structure shown above, 
creditors will have no reason to restructure in the first place. Here, the result would be 
that no creditors restructure, which would render collective action clauses useless.  
B. Why Argentina’s Response is Important 
 As noted in the preceding section, the judicial outcome of NML Capital, seems to 
meet one of the two main criteria set forth in Section III. To its credit, the current judicial 
resolution upholds the backbone of good-faith negotiations by enforcing the rights of 
holdout creditors. By upholding those rights in such a strong way, the court effectively 
reinforced the notion of “bargaining in the shadow of the law.” However, while 
protecting the rights of creditors, the judicial outcome also substantially decreased the 
incentive to restructure when it is socially optimal to do so. When a sovereign is in a “bad 
state” and is unable to pay its full debt obligations, it is in the best interest of all parties 
involved for the creditors to cooperate and consent to a restructuring agreement. If a 
sovereign and its creditors are not able to successfully undertake a debt restructuring, it is 
likely that none of the creditors will recover, and the sovereign will simply be unable to 
make any payments.  While the recent addition of collective action clauses to sovereign 
debt agreements is meant to alleviate that problem, the model outlined above suggests 
that the judicial decision will undermine the effectiveness of collective action clauses in 
creating a coordination tool.  
 However, the judicial response is only half of the equation. Because of 
Argentina’s unique role as a sovereign, the judicial remedy in the NML Capital case was 
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limited to an injunction. Through its ability to control third parties, the Second Circuit 
was able to prohibit Argentina from paying the exchange debt without also paying the 
holdouts. The court was unable to force Argentina to pay the amount owed on the 
original bonds. Thus, Argentina still has a fair amount of autonomy with respect to its 
response to the judicial decision. This section will argue that while it may seem 
counterintuitive, the socially optimal response (i.e., the response that yields the greatest 
total social utility) to the judicial outcome is for Argentina to default (or completely 
repudiate) and not make payments to either class of debt. However, the socially optimal 
response is not the optimal response for Argentina. Because Argentina is a repeat player 
in the international debt market, it is likely that the sovereign will comply with the 
Second Circuit’s decision to the greatest extent possible in order to ensure that it can 
obtain relatively low-cost financing in the future.  
1. An Argentine default as the socially optimal response to NML capital 
 As stated in Section III, the goals of a sovereign debt regime should be to 
maintain creditors’ rights sufficient to garner good-faith efforts by the sovereign and to 
incentivize “efficient restructuring” (i.e. restructuring when a sovereign is in a “bad 
state”). However, the model presented above shows that the NML Capital decision, if 
upheld, presents a serious risk of disincentivizing any restructuring possibility. Yet, 
Argentina may substantially affect future creditors’ decision calculus depending on its 
response.  If the Second Circuit’s injunction is upheld, Argentina seems to have three 
possible responses. First, it could attempt to continue to make full payments to the 
exchange debt and pay the original debt (the holdouts) in full. Second, the sovereign may 
decide not to make full payments, but rather make pro rata payments to each class. 
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Alternatively, the Argentine Republic could elect not to make payments to either class of 
debt. While this last option is not optimal for the short run interests of current creditors, it 
is the long-term best response for the stability of the sovereign debt system. 
a. Payment in Full and Pro Rata Payments to both classes 
 By paying both classes of debt in full, Argentina would reinforce the incentives to 
hold out as outlined by the model above.  Under this scenario, both the holdouts and the 
exchange debt would receive the full compensation that they agreed upon. However, this 
course would mark a clear victory for holdouts.  If Argentina pays the holdouts in full, 
holders of the exchange bonds will know they essentially forfeited seventy-five percent 
of their legal entitlements. As noted, this undermines the effectiveness of collective 
action clauses. After seeing the holdouts recover in full, no future investors will willingly 
forfeit her legal right to full payment for a restructured amount.96 So even with the 
minimum threshold collective action clauses create, it seems unlikely that any creditor 
will elect to restructure, let alone the requisite majority necessary for the collective action 
clause to be effective.  
 The same problem is true if Argentina makes pro rata payments pursuant to the 
Second Circuit’s injunction. In this scenario, the holdouts would recover the same 
proportion of their original entitlement (a higher amount) as the exchange holders (a 
substantially lower amount). Again, future creditors have no incentive in this scenario to 
agree to a debt exchange or restructuring. If they know that they will ultimately be paid 
                                                
96 However, for this scenario to come to pass, the exchange debt still plays an important role. Without the 
exchange, Argentina’s total debt would be so insurmountable that payment in full would not be an option. 
The restricting of 2005 and 2010 lowered Argentina’s obligations with respect to 90% of its creditors. If 
not for those restructurings, payment in full would not be an option. This shows a circular problem: when 
none of the creditors restructure, none of the creditors will be able to recover. This problem is addressed 
below.  
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only a fraction of what they are owed, creditors will obviously choose the fraction of the 
larger amount (the original bonds) over the smaller amount (the exchange bonds).  Again, 
every rational creditor will choose the maintain her original entitlements and none will 
restructure.  
The difference between these two alternatives is really whether Argentina is able 
to increase the total amount it pays to creditors or whether the Republic has a fixed 
amount which it will be able to allocate to servicing its debt. The first scenario could lead 
to the first alternative in which both classes are paid in full. The second alternative where 
Argentina will pay a fixed amount and allocate that amount between the two classes of 
debt is more likely. If Argentina could substantially vary the total amount it pays to 
creditors (either through increased tax revenues or altered domestic spending habits), it 
probably would not have needed to restructure in the first place. However, the sovereign 
is bound by what it is able to collect in tax revenues, making this ability relatively 
unlikely. Instead, it is probable that Argentina knows that it can make a fixed amount of 
total payments to service all of its debt. Under this scenario, the decision to accept the 
exchange offer or continue with the holdout only affects the relative allocation of funds 
to the creditors. But the effect is the same for both scenarios. In both cases, it is in the 
creditors’ best interest to hold out to gain a larger proportion of whatever sum is 
distributed.97  
                                                
97 Notably, under the scenario where Argentina will distribute a fixed amount among exchange and holdout 
creditors,  if every creditor holds out, the effect will be identical to every party restructuring. For example, 
if Argentina’s original debt obligations are $10 Billion, but the sovereign is only able to make payments in 
total of $2 Billion, Argentina will attempt to restructure to reflect their ability to pay. Their offer will 
probably be approximately $0.20 on each dollar owed. If every party agrees to the exchange, each creditor 
will receive 20% of his original entitlement. However, if no parties restructure, Argentina’s obligations are 
still $10 Billion, but it is only able to pay 20% of that obligation. Again, each creditor recovers 20% of her 
original obligation.  In this example, it does not matter whether the parties all restructure or all hold out, 
their recovery amount will be the same. However, the point is that when parties will choose between 
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b. The Effect of a Complete Argentine Default (or “repudiation” of debt) 
 Despite the incentives created by the Second Circuit, Argentina is in an incredibly 
influential position to increase stability in the sovereign debt market. They could do so 
by completely defaulting on both classes of debt and not making payments to either class. 
While this will result in short term losses for all of its creditors, a default will send a clear 
message to future creditors.  
 As noted above, the problematic effect of the Second Circuit’s decision is the 
reality that if any amount is distributed to Argentina’s original and exchange debt, the 
holdouts are the clear winners, as they recover a higher portion of the original entitlement 
at the expense of the exchange debt. However, the scenario plays out quite differently 
when no creditors recover.  If Argentina chooses or is unable to pay any of its debt 
obligations as a result of the Second Circuit’s injunction, future creditors will once again 
have an incentive to agree to restructuring offers.  Argentina’s refusal to pay would 
reinstate the real possibility that, under a certain set of circumstances where creditors 
holdout, some creditors would lose the entirety of their investment. If creditors perceive a 
very real possibility that widespread holdouts will result in complete default by the 
sovereign, they will once again have an incentive to restructure in good faith when a 
country is in a “bad state.” In the case where each class of debt is paid an equal pro rata 
                                                                                                                                            
restructuring and holding out,  none will willingly restructure. In a scenario when 90% of the creditors 
restructure and 10% hold out, the allocation of the $2 Billion at stake will play out as follows:  
 
 
 
So Argentina will be able to make payments to each class of debt representing 17.8% of its obligation to 
each. However, since the holdouts are still entitled to their original $10 Million, they receive a higher 
proportion of their original entitlement (17.8%) whereas the restructured debt only receives 17.8% of their 
20% entitlement under the restructure, or 3.57% of the original agreement.  
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share, as prescribed by the Second Circuit, that consideration is completely absent, 
leading to an outcome where every creditor chooses to holdout.  
However, while an Argentine repudiation of debts may encourage many of the 
creditors to accept future offers to restructure, it still leaves open the possibility that a 
small percentage of creditors may try to “shirk” and  attempt to recover substantial 
payoffs pursuant to the Second Circuit’s decision. Essentially, it returns the state of 
affairs to the present case prior to the NML Capital decision. This consideration is why 
collective action clauses may once again be relevant if Argentina decides not to make 
payments to either class.  After the NML Capital decision, future creditors need an 
impetus to shift their optimal decision from holding out to accepting a restructure. A 
complete default or repudiation by Argentina would serve that purpose; collective action 
clauses will not be undermined if most creditors regain the incentive to restructure when 
it is efficient to do so. So although a few creditors may want to behave opportunistically 
to recover a higher portion than their peers, collective action clauses will solve that 
problem for future contracts as they were intended to do. Therefore, while an offer to 
restructure may not persuade every creditor to accept the exchange, the offer need only 
persuade the requisite threshold specified by the collective action clause in order to be 
effective. Thus, while the short-term consequences of a refusal to pay are not desirable 
and may even constitute a bad faith effort by Argentina, such a repudiation would 
counteract NML Capital v. Argentina’s debilitating effect on collective action clauses and 
the strong incentives to holdout it created. Therefore, a complete default is precisely the 
response that will yield the socially optimal response for future sovereign debt 
agreements.  
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2. Argentina’s individual incentives do not align with the socially optimal outcome 
Until this point, this analysis has not examined the problem from the perspective 
of Argentina as a rational, self-interested debtor. While an Argentine default may 
promote long-term efficiency from a social perspective, Argentina’s individual interests 
suggest that it will not repudiate its debt obligations.  
 As a sovereign actor, foreign courts cannot force Argentina to make payments on 
its debts with assets located outside the foreign court’s jurisdiction. In certain 
circumstances, foreign courts may be able to seize Argentine assets98 being used for 
commercial purposes and liquidate them to satisfy Argentina’s creditors.99 However, 
short of those extreme circumstances, Argentina is under no legally enforceable 
obligation to repay its debt. Any choice to do so must stem from extra-legal motivations.  
Argentina and its lawyers in the Southern District of New York and the Second 
Circuit have threatened to withhold payment to the holdouts.100 If the Republic’s threat 
holds true, the threat would have the effect of withholding payment from all debt holders, 
as the court ordered injunction would render third-party banks incapable of paying the 
exchange bondholders absent payment to holdouts. While these threats were probably 
made to elicit a favorable ruling in the NML Capital litigation and have only a short-term 
perspective, the arguments made above suggest that Argentina’s threatened response is 
critical for maintaining a well-functioning sovereign debt system.  
                                                
98 One of the more controversial parts of the Second Circuit’s decision was a liberal grant for discovery 
proceedings which purport to allow NML Capital to identify all Argentinian assets around the globe.  The 
Supreme Court has accepted Argentina’s petition for certiorari to, which argues that this broad grant 
violates the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and asks the court to overturn the discovery grant.   
99 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610. 
100 Peter Eavis, Argentina’s Bond Case is Being Closely Watched for Ramifications, NY TIMES DEALBOOK 
(February 27, 2013), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/argentinas-bond-case-is-being-
closely-watched-for-ramifications/. 
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There is a vast body of economic literature that seeks to answer the question: 
“why do sovereigns repay their debts?” The answer to this question will reveal 
Argentina’s individual considerations and may suggest whether it will repudiate its debt 
obligations. Many have argued that there is a strong reputational component to sovereign 
lending, and sovereigns choose to pay their creditors because doing so will maintain 
future lines of credit at lower interest rates.101  
The logic behind this conventional approach to the risk-reward relationship is 
simple. When a sovereign defaults, bondholders are economically harmed and will be 
less likely to lend to the same sovereign in the future. While the precise relationship 
between a sovereign default and the risk premium associated with future bonds is 
difficult to predict ex ante102, some have successfully calculated the risk premium ex post. 
Of notable significance for the case at hand, Kris Mitchener and Marc Weidenmier 
estimated the increased risk premium on Argentinian debt following a prior default 
during the Baring Crisis of 1890.103  Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, much like the 
1990s, capital flowed into Argentina at unprecedented rates, and lending to the South 
American country accounted for a substantial portion of international lending.104 When 
Argentina ultimately defaulted on approximately £48 Million, Mitchener and 
Weidenmier estimate that the market premium on Argentinian bonds increased by 840 
                                                
101 Herschel Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, 
Repudiation, and Reputation, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1673, 1985). 
102 Aguiar et al., supra note 68, at 82. 
103 Kris Mitchener & Marc Weidenmier, The Baring Crisis and the Great Latin American Meltdown of the 
1890s, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13404, 2007). 
104 Id. at 3-4. ("As a result of the open capital markets that prevailed in the nineteenth century, Argentina 
was able to borrow extensively abroad. It was the fifth largest sovereign borrower in the world. It absorbed 
roughly 11 percent of all ne issues in the new London market between 1884 and 1890 and 40 to 50 percent 
of all lending that occurred outside the United Kingdom in 1888… Taylor suggests that ‘the 188s stand out 
as a period of totally unprecedented capital inflows into an emerging market at any time in history.’ The 
current account deficit, as a percentage of GDP, averaged 20 percent from 1884 to 1889.”) 
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basis points in the year following the default and by more than 1,600 basis points in the 
five years following the default.105  Essentially, these authors’ research quantified the 
increase in the risk premium on Argentinian bonds following the country’s default, even 
in a 19th century market that was far less sophisticated than today’s. Other authors have 
shown similar negative effects on defaulting sovereigns. Sule Ozler showed a 
corresponding increase in risk premia for defaulting countries in the context of private 
lending agreements and estimated that a sovereign’s default history accounted for 
between 11 and 50 percent of the risk premia private lenders charged to developing 
countries.106 Eaton and Gersovitz argue that private lenders create maximum credit limits, 
or  “credit ceilings” for defaulting sovereigns, which represent the maximum amount that 
the private lender will be willing to lend the sovereign in the future.107 Although the 
private lending context is distinguishable from public bond markets, a sovereign’s default 
should have similar negative repercussions for the public sector in both financing 
arrangements.  Furthermore, Şenay Ağca and Oya Celasun show that the negative effects 
of sovereign default are not limited to the public sector. In their 2012 study, the authors 
identify a positive correlation between sovereign default risk and lending interest rates to 
corporate entities.108 Ağca and Celasun suggest that a sovereign default increases the risk 
that a corporate entity will face higher tax burdens in the future, and therefore lenders and 
bond purchasers attribute a higher risk premium to corporations whose sovereign has 
defaulted. 
                                                
105 Id. at 2. 
106 Sule Ozler, Have Commercial Banks Ignored History? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 3959, 1993). 
107 Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 1981).  
108 S ̧enay Ag ̆ca & Oya Celasun, Sovereign Debt and Corporate Borrowing Costs in Emerging Markets, 88 
JOURNAL OF INT’L ECONOMICS 198 (2012).  
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Thus, it seems likely that the need for future financing, whether through the bond 
market or through private lending, will compel Argentina to honor the obligations that it 
owes to its creditors in line with the Second Circuit’s holding. Argentina’s refusal to pay 
its current debt obligations would result in higher rates of interest in the future and 
perhaps unwillingness by future lenders to purchase Argentine bonds. Some have 
criticized this view as over-simplified,109 and have suggested that lenders must be able to 
threaten trade sanctions or other adverse effects to international trade in order to persuade 
a sovereign to honor its debt commitments.110 However, even those authors do not 
completely discredit the reputational effects of a sovereign default on future credit 
terms.111  
As is evident from Argentina’s long history with sovereign defaults, Argentina is 
a repeat player in the international bond market and will necessarily need to obtain 
financing in the future. Thus, conventional logic seems to indicate that it is probable 
Argentina will attempt to make some good faith payments to its exchange bondholders 
                                                
109 See, Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43 
(March 1989) (The authors argue that reputational considerations alone are insufficient to keep developing 
countries from repudiating debt and that creditors must have the ability to issue sanctions upon or affect 
trade with a defaulting creditor in order to persuade sovereigns to perform on the loan contracts. However, 
the authors notably confine their analysis to development loan contracts. These are contractual lending 
agreements between a single institution, such as a bank, and a sovereign. Wile the reasoning the authors use 
may be similar; this situation is distinguishable from international bond offerings. First, bilateral lending 
agreements are likely to be much smaller in scale than an international issuance of bonds. Second, a 
repudiated lending agreement only negatively affects a single lender, whereas a repudiation of bonds 
affects hundreds or thousands of lenders on a worldwide basis.) See also, Kris Mitchener & Marc 
Weidenmier, Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 8853, 2002. (Noting that the ability of a lender to effectively issue “supersanctions” such as 
military threats and trade interruptions was statistically correlated with lower risk premia on future lending 
terms with a defaulting sovereign.) 
110 Andrew Rose, One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade, (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8853, 2002)(Here, the author shows that a restructuring of a 
sovereign by the Paris Club results in significant reductions in international trade.) 
111 Id. at 1. (Noting that countries with poor repayment reputations have difficulty borrowing and difficulty 
obtaining favorable lending terms in the future.) 
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and likewise have to make pro rata payments to the holdouts. However, there is an 
alternative “altruism” consideration that may suggest that Argentina will not act as a 
rational, self-interested actor and instead will default on its obligations, despite the 
negative reputational benefits of such a default, in order to bestow positive effects on the 
sovereign bond market. Paul Rubin suggests this idea in the context of public goods.112  
In order for this altruistic approach to be a possibility, Argentina must (a) recognize the 
greater social utility of its default, (b) convince others that its motivations are altruistic 
and not opportunistic, and (c) be willing to bear the individual economic repercussions of 
such default discussed above. Even if Argentina could recognize the social benefit of a 
default on the economic system (a) and convince others of its good intentions (b), it is 
unlikely that Argentina could afford to act altruistically (c) given its current economic 
state. As discussed above, a default would impede Argentina’s ability to borrow in the 
future, a consideration that would almost certainly outweigh any incentive to behave 
altruistically. Therefore, while an Argentine default would likely remedy the Second 
Circuit’s decision and achieve stability in the sovereign bond market, it is unlikely that 
Argentina will take that course of action because it simply cannot afford to do so.  
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PART VI: CONCLUSION 
Over the last decade, the market for sovereign debt has played out like a crime-
thriller novel. Each subsequent development has added layers of complexity and has 
“changed the game” in some regard. The storyline has been set by foundational 
complications of sovereign debt. Subsequent discussions of an IMF sponsored Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism contributed to one chapter in the story, but the plot was 
quickly complicated by the widespread implementation of collective action clauses in 
2003. Now, it seems as though another chapter is beginning. If the NML Capital case is 
upheld and Argentina is forced to pay its holdout creditors, the decision reached by the 
Second Circuit will render Collective Action Clauses nearly useless. Under those facts, it 
will never be in a creditor’s best interest to restructure debt holdings, as both holdouts 
and creditors will be paid in equal proportion to one another. However, after the judicial 
resolution of the lawsuit, Argentina has an opportunity to add yet another chapter.  
At this point in time, it is impossible to know whether Argentina’s short-term 
perspective will cede to a more strategic, long-term approach to financing. If so, one 
would guess Argentina will not follow-through on its threat to repudiate its debt and will 
at least partially pay its creditors. However, based on the model, analysis, and arguments 
made above, investors should cross their fingers that Argentina is shortsighted. While 
Argentina’s threatened course of action (complete repudiation) will render the sovereign 
unable to secure favorable financing in the future and will leave holders of the 2005 and 
2010 Argentine exchange bonds much worse off, these short term losses would benefit 
future holders of bonds and afford the rest of society a much more stable system for 
international sovereign debt.  
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However, recent petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States 
may take the ultimate decision out of Argentina’s hands and place it squarely in the hands 
of the United States judiciary. Currently, two petitions for certiorari have been submitted 
to the Supreme Court. The first petition, which the Supreme Court has already accepted, 
asks the court to overrule the Second Circuit’s decision with respect to discovery of 
Argentinian assets abroad. This portion of the decision deals with the judicial 
enforcement of the court’s holding. The second petition, which has been submitted to the 
court but not yet accepted, asks the court to overturn the Second Circuit’s holding that the 
pari passu clause gives holdout bond holders full rights to payment relative to holders of 
restructured bonds. I will briefly analyze how these two petitions could affect the 
outcome of the Second Circuit’s NML Capital decision.  
The second petition, which addresses the policy question at the heart of the NML 
Capital holding, is somewhat easier to resolve. While the Second Circuit’s holding is 
problematic in that it creates an incentive for future bondholders to refuse a restructuring 
when it is efficient to do so, the alternative holding would be equally problematic. If the 
Second Circuit would have held that the holdout creditors do not have equal rights to the 
restructured debt, the court would have severely handicapped future negotiations by 
limiting the judicial rights of holdout creditors. Stated differently, so long as holdout 
creditors have legally enforceable rights, both parties have an incentive to negotiate in 
good faith. This idea has been referred to as “bargaining in the shadow of the law,” 
throughout this paper. A contrary holding by the Second Circuit would eliminate the legal 
backbone that promotes efficient negotiation. Therefore, if the Supreme Court overturned 
the Second Circuit’s decision on the merits, the sovereign bond market would no longer 
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have a problem with opportunistic holdout creditors, but it would begin to have a 
problem with opportunistic sovereigns. Under a regime where holdouts do not have 
legally enforceable rights, a sovereign could act opportunistically and restructure 
whenever it desired to do so. Bondholders would be forced to restructure, as refusing to 
do so would result in complete non-payment of the sovereigns outstanding obligations. 
Therefore, if the Supreme Court chooses to accept the petition for certiorari based on the 
rights of the holdout creditors, the main holding of the Second Circuit should be upheld.  
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could deny the certiorari petition and implicitly uphold 
the Second Circuit’s decision. 
A more interesting possibility is that the Supreme Court could use the petition for 
certiorari related to enforceability and discovery as a way to uphold the rights of holdout 
creditors but to strip the Second Circuit’s judgment of its teeth. Stated differently, the 
Supreme Court may uphold the intent of the Second Circuit’s holding by affirming the 
rights of holdout creditors, but it would limit judgments in the holdouts’ favor by 
disallowing discovery proceedings to identify sovereign assets within the reach of US 
court attachment. This second possibility would return the sovereign bond market to a 
similar state as before the Second Circuit issued the NML Capital decision.  Blocking the 
discovery efforts of holdout creditors seeking to attach sovereign assets would markedly 
reduce the incentive to hold out in the wake of a sovereign debt restructuring and would 
substantially diminish the possibility of recovery.  
As this paper has argued, an Argentinian repudiation of debt is the optimal 
outcome to the Second Circuit’s decision. However, because it is unlikely that Argentina 
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will choose to repudiate its entire debt obligations, the best opportunity for stability in the 
sovereign bond market seems to lie in the hands of the Supreme Court.  
